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Abstract.  Previous work modeling a legislature in which bill proposals and voting take a form analogous
to offer-counteroffer bargaining offer a new view of what legislative parties are and why they are formed. 
However, such models either represent preferences as being purely distributive in nature, so that there are
no variations in preference similarity across legislators and thus no reason for any particular group of
legislators to form a party; or else used a full spatial model of legislative preferences, which lacks
tractability.  To gain the advantages from both approaches, this paper analyzes a distributive model with
simple externalities.  The model is employed to gain an improved understanding of the conditions under
which legislative parties can be said to effect outcomes beyond what could be expected from purely
myopic, rational behavior among legislators with similar preferences.
draft 1.2
This paper was prepared for presentation at the annual meetings of the American Political Science
Association, August 29-Sept. 1, 1996, San Francisco.  The authors are grateful to David Austen-Smith and
to seminar participants at Duke University, Harvard University, and Northwestern University for comments
on material that preceded this paper.Legislative Coalitions in a
Bargaining Model with Externalities
Randall L. Calvert and Nathan Dietz
Introduction
The recent literature on political parties in Congress features a renewed interest in the nature of parties and
new ideas for understanding parties in terms of the political motivations of legislators.  Several analysts
(Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Rohde 1991) have suggested
that parties are designed by legislators to overcome complex problems of delegation, collective action, or
coalition building in the legislature, and discussed the design of parties, the behavior of members in the
context of legislative parties, and the affects of such parties on legislative structure and legislative
outcomes.  By and large, these studies have constructed or sketched models of a fairly complex legislative
process within which the delegation, collective action, and coalition building problems occur.  
A few authors, however, have tackled the problem of party organization among rational legislators in
different ways.  Baron and Ferejohn (1989) take a more stripped-down approach to the modeling of the
legislative process, portraying it simply as a series of distributional offers proposed by individual members
and accepted or rejected by a vote of the legislative body.  In this context, Baron (1989, 1991) proceeds to
develop the idea of a party as an agreement allowing a given coalition to control legislative outcomes at the
expense of nonmembers of the coalition.
In an entirely different vein, Krehbiel (1993) questions how we should interpret legislative party as a
phenomenon separate from simple rational behavior of individual legislators with similar preferences.  He
argues that we cannot draw conclusions about the effect, and effectiveness, of parties simply from the
observation that legislators having consistently similar goals exhibit consistently similar voting choices;
those legislators would be expected to vote similarly anyway, and the proponent of party significance in
legislative outcomes must show that parties play a role beyond simply naming a group of members with
similar preferences.  Krehbiel believes that parties are significant only to the extent that "individual
legislators vote with fellow party members in spite of their disagreement about the policy in question"
(1993, 238).  It is possible, however, that the independent effect of parties lies instead in the nature of the
bills that are presented for voting, rather than in the voting decisions of legislators, as suggested by
Snyder's (1992) account of the basis for apparent unidimensionality in roll-call voting.  If we want to
resolve the question of whether parties have a significant effect on legislative outcomes, independently of
legislator preferences, it is necessary to explain how individual members not organized by parties would
generate bills for voting as well as how those members would vote.  The purpose of this paper is to
contribute to such an explanation.
Baron's initial portrayal of legislation as an extended bargaining process (1989; Baron and Ferejohn 1989)
is not suitable for addressing the issues raised by Krehbiel, since legislative bills in those models are
matters of pure distribution:  each proposal would simply divide a fixed "pie" among the members, and
each legislator cares only about the size of his or her own slice.  In that setting, there can be no interesting
patterns of preference similarity.  Even so, Baron identifies a motivation for legislators to form parties in
that setting:  by being a member of a coalition whose members always make proposals favoring the
coalition at the expense of nonmembers, the individual gains a higher expected payoff.  Aldrich (1995)
discusses this same motivation in a different theoretical context; such considerations go back ultimately to
the reasoning of Buchanan and Tullock (1962, chapters 9-11) that majority rule allows a majority coalition
to exploit a minority coalition.
Baron (1991), however, extends the "bargaining" model of legislatures to the choice of positions in a
multidimensional policy space, over which the participants have quadratic preferences.  The stated purpose2
1  Aside from the two-period example that they introduce for illustrative purposes.  The model
described here is the potentially infinite-period, "closed-rule" model with no discounting.
of that model is to examine the process of coalition formation among parties in a parliamentary
government; the same model would in principle be ideal for examining proposals and voting patterns in any
legislature.  With such a model, one could depict patterns of similarity in the policy goals of legislators, and
determine the extent to which such legislators might exhibit party-like similarities in voting without the
benefit of any real party mechanisms to control their voting or bill-proposing behavior.
Unfortunately, calculations in the Baron (1991) model become intractable in all but the simplest settings. 
Baron is able to derive closed-form solutions for stationary equilibria of proposal and voting strategies only
for certain very restrictive special cases having only three or four legislators and a specific layout of ideal
points.  In this paper, we propose a model that retains a bit more of the simplicity of the pure-distribution
setting but still allows for the depiction of preference similarities among legislators.  This model allows us
to begin to distinguish conceptually between true party-driven legislative behavior and the purely
preference-driven, faux-party behavioral similarities recognized by Krehbiel.  Our main accomplishment in
this paper is to clarify Krehbiel's idea of what ought to be the baseline from which party significance is
assessed, using a model that incorporates proposals of bills, as well as voting, among otherwise
unorganized rational legislators.
Bargaining Models of Legislative Politics
In their original bargaining model of legislative politics, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) set up a simple
legislative game having two distinguishing features.  First, the only task of the legislature is to decide on the
division of a fixed stock of resources among its members.  All members value their own allocation of this
stock in the same way; none receives any utility from resources allocated to other members.  Second,
legislative procedure is explicitly modeled as a process of recognition of a member to propose a division of
the stock, followed by voting on that proposal.  If a proposal passes, the legislators realize their payoffs
and the game ends.  If not, the game continues with another round of recognition and voting.  Baron and
Ferejohn consider several variants on this simple procedure in order to study the effects of closed rules,
amendment processes, and the like.  For present purposes, it suffices to consider the simplest version of
their model.
1
The Baron-Ferejohn legislature consists of a set of members L = {1, 2, . . ., n} where n = 2m!1 for some
integer m, so m is the size of a minimal majority and n is an odd number.  An outcome of the legislative
process is any distribution x = (x1 , . . . , xn) of shares of a fixed stock of resources, with each xj$0 and 3L
xj = 1.  Each legislator i receives utility from a distribution x simply equal to xi.  The game form consists of
the following parliamentary procedure "stage game," repeated if necessary:
(1)  A legislator is recognized at random to propose a distribution.  In this recognition process, legislator i
is recognized with probability pi, with each pj$0 and 3L pj = 1.
(2)  The legislature votes on the proposal, with all members voting simultaneously.
(3)  If a majority votes for the proposal, the game ends and players receive their payoffs; otherwise, the
stage game is repeated starting at (1).  Note that the legislator who made the failed proposal is eligible to be
recognized again.
Baron and Ferejohn define a stationary strategy si for legislator i in this game as consisting of:3
(1)  a proposal rule, describing what proposal x
i = (x1
i , . . . , xn
i) player i will make whenever recognized;
and
(2)  a voting rule, such as "Vote in favor of any proposal having xi$y, and against any other," which
specfies how the player will vote on any proposal.
Such strategies are "stationary" in that they are not contingent on the history of play in the game, that is, on
previous unsuccessful proposals, who made them, or how various members voted on them.  (Of course,
non-stationary strategies are possible too; we will have more to say about these subsequently.)  A
stationary equilibrium in this game is a profile of stationary strategies s = (s1, . . . , sn) for which, for each i,
(1)  i could not get a better expected outcome by proposing some other x
i* at any point;
(2)  i could not get a better expected outcome by voting otherwise on any proposal at any point;
(3)  i's strategy is not weakly dominated (due to its voting rule specifying a vote that would harm i if i's vote
were pivotal, in an outcome in which i is in fact not pivotal); and
(4)  conditions (1)-(3) hold in every possible subgame (subgame perfection).
Baron and Ferejohn prove that the following properties hold for any stationary equilibrium:
(1)  the proposing player always offers xj
i = 1/n to each player in some randomly chosen group of m!1
players, keeps 1!(m!1)/n for herself, and offers the others zero;
(2)  each player i always votes for any proposal offering i at least 1/n and against any other proposal;
(3)  in equilibrium, the first proposal made is always accepted;
(4)  ex ante, each player can expect to receive a payoff of 1/n;  the player selected as the first proposer ends
up receiving 1 - (m-1)/n
(5)  any minimal winning coalition is as likely to form as any other.
In particular, property (5) indicates that there are no legislative parties in this game in any sense.
Parties in Bargaining Models
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) also examine briefly what can happen in their model when strategies are not
stationary.  They begin by assuming that players discount by some small factor any payoffs to be received
from the next proposal, should the present one fail.  With this proviso Baron and Ferejohn are able to prove
a "folk theorem:"  any distribution of the stock of resources can be supported as the outcome of some
equilibrium strategy profile, provided that the discounting is sufficiently light and that n$5.  A distribution
x is implemented through a strategy profile that punishes any player who proposes any other distribution
y￿x, as follows:  some designated majority M(y) votes against the deviant proposal y; the next proposer is
to make a new proposal z(y) that gives all members of M(y) what they would have gotten in y, plus a share
of what the deviant would have gotten, and gives the deviant zero; and if that second proposer fails to
propose z(y), the same sort of punishment is then directed at him, and punishment of the initial deviant is
abandoned.  Although Baron and Ferejohn do not examine parties explicitly in their paper, this result
suggests the possibility that a sort of legislative party might be formed, since it is possible to implement a
distribution in which a particular coalition would with certainty receive all of the stock of resources.  We
return subsequently to the related notion that a legislative party consists of a particular repeated-game
equilibrium.4
2  As in the discussion of Baron and Ferejohn (1989), we confine attention to the closed-rule case,
although Baron also examines a version in which legislators can propose amendments.  Within the closed-
rule setting, Baron examines cases in which coalition members do and do not have the ability to commit
themselves to "party discipline" in voting.  Under party discipline, when a non-member makes a proposal,
coalition members will vote for it only if it gives every coalition member the share he or she would get from
a proposal by another coalition member.  Here we examine only the non-discipline case, since it is most
relevant to the question at hand; in this case, a non-member need not gain the votes of all coalition members
simultaneously in order to pass a proposal.
3  Baron's main result, and his purpose in this model, is to show that the optimal coalition in this
setting will, generally, have more than m members.  This is because optimal coalition size must balance
how thinly coalition proposals spread their benefits against the probability that a proposer outside the
coalition will be recognized, resulting in a lower ex ante expected payoff to coalition members.
In a subsequent paper Baron (1989) examines a related model that generates party-like behavior in a
bargaining legislature, again restricting attention to stationary strategies.  In this paper,
2 Baron assumes
that members of a coalition can commit perfectly in advance to making a certain proposal if recognized. 
By using this ability to commit to a proposal that, although it still may favor the proposer, distributes the
remainder of the benefits only to members of the coalition, a majority "party" can ensure most benefits for
itself.  In this equilibrium, however, if a coalition non-member is recognized, that proposer will be able to
pick off some coalition votes and get her proposal passed.  Even so, as Baron shows, there is an advantage
to being a member of such a coalition.
3  Baron also demonstrates that if the players discount future payoffs
to differing extents, some coalitions will offer a higher payoff advantage to their members than other
coalitions will to theirs; in this sense, some groupings of legislators would make more sense as a "majority
party" than others.  However, this sort of legislative party lacks a feature of primary importance to parties
in the real world:  since all they are doing is dividing a pie, there is no particular policy-based reason for a
legislator to prefer some coalition partners to others.  In contrast, we normally think of parties as consisting
of members who want something in common, and in contrast to party non-members.
In "A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems," Baron (1991)
examines one further approach to understanding party formation through a bargaining model.  Here, rather
than dividing a fixed stock of resources, the players are engaged in choosing a point in a policy space in
which all have quadratic preferences; thus they are restricted in the ways they are able to divide the
available policy benefits.  Although the analysis is couched in terms of forming a coalition government in a
parliamentary system, it speaks to legislative proposing and voting in exactly the same way as the model in
Baron (1989), with one important advantage:  due to the relative locations of their ideal points, the
legislators in a spatial bargaining model have more reason to coalesce with some of their colleagues than
with others.  Thus there could, in principle, be parties whose members have prior, common interests
inherently opposed to those of non-members, beyond simple distributional jockeying.  Unfortunately,
calculation of equilibrium outcomes in the spatial bargaining model turns out to be extremely complicated. 
Baron is able to derive a closed-form solution only for the following special cases:  (1) three players whose
ideals are co-linear; (2) three players whose ideal points are all equidistant from one another, each having a
1/3 chance of recognition; (3) three players whose ideal points form the vertices of an isosceles triangle,
with the player whose ideal is equidistant from the other two never being recognized to propose; (4) four
players, three at the vertices of an equilateral triangle and one at the center of the triangle, all having equal5
4  Baron also examines a couple of three-player cases in which the members make proposals in a
sequence of recognition that is fixed in advance, a setting more relevant to the formation of parliamentary
coalition governments than to the formation of voting coalitions on a bill.
probability of recognition.
4  The results indicate that legislators whose ideal points are centrally located
receive higher payoffs than others, and that legislators usually propose so as to attract the vote of the
nearest colleague, but in equilibrium must sometimes propose so as to attract the vote of a more distant
colleague instead.
A Bargaining Model with Preference Similarities
In order to gain additional analytical leverage on the problem while retaining the possibility of varying
preference similarities among legislators, consider a variation on the Baron-Ferejohn, pure-distribution
bargaining model of the legislature.  Begin with the Baron-Ferejohn setting of a legislature L in which each
member i is recognized with probability pi to propose a distribution of a fixed stock of resources of size 1. 
Now, however, let us broaden our assumption about the utility to a member of a particular distribution x of
the stock, as follows:
ui(x) = 3j0L aijxj
where aii = 1 and, for i￿j, aij # 1.  Thus the share received by a player may affect the payoffs of other
players to varying extents.  The direct interpretation of this payoff function is that each legislator cares not
only about his or her own allocation of the stock, but also to some extent about the shares of some other
members.  This would be the case, for example, if the good being distributed were not purely private but
rather had spillover effects.
A utility function of this form could also result from other constructions.  For example:  (1)  Legislators
wish only to gain the approval of interest groups in their districts.  Benefits are "distributed" not to
legislators but to interest groups, with different legislators having different concentrations of the groups in
their prospective election-winning coalitions at home.  This utility function represents simply an adding up
of the distributive payoffs to the various interest groups, weighted by the prevalence of that group in
member i's constituency.  (Obviously the model could be broadened to allow a the number of interest
groups to differ from the number of legislators.)  (2)  This utility function approximates a spatial model. 
The aij are inverse distances between legislators' positions in some issue space, and the legislators'
indifference curves are straight lines.  (Again, obviously the dimensionality of the issue space could be
made different from the number of legislators.)
Since this utility function is simpler in form than the quadratic preferences examined by Baron (1991),
there is reason to hope that it will yield more extensive results, allowing us to say more about the nature of
legislative parties.  Thus far we have been able to obtain some improvement on Baron's results by deriving
a closed-form solution to a general three-player case.  In what follows, we present an illustrative special
case, and then proceed to the analysis of the general three-legislator situation with symmetrical spillovers
(aij=aji always).  For simplicity we assume throughout the remainder of this paper that the legislators'
probabilities of recognition are equal:  pi = 1/n.
An Illustrative Case
Let L={1, 2, 3} and suppose that the only spillover effect is a symmetrical one between legislators 1 and 2: 
that is, a12=a21=" for some "0[0,1], while a13=a31=a23=a32=0.  Thus for an allocation x=(x1, x2, x3), the
players would receive the following payoffs:6
u1(x) = x1 + "x2
u2(x) = "x1 + x2
u3(x) = x3 = 1 - x1 - x2.
Several of the main considerations of the Baron-Ferejohn model are important for solving this new game. 
First, given any profile of strategies for proposing and voting, we can calculate a continuation value for
each player (i.e. the expected payoff from the remainder of the game as seen before anyone is recognized to
make the next proposal).  Second, we in order to have her proposal accepted, a player i must gain the vote
of at least one other player j by offering j a large enough allocation to offset the possible gain to j from
defeating i's proposal and perhaps being able to make j's own, more favorable proposal on the next round. 
Third, it never makes sense to offer a partner an allocation any amount beyond that just large enough to
attract his vote.  In equilibrium, exactly one player will make a proposal, and that first proposal will be
accepted by a majority; off the equilibrium path, a subgame-perfect equilibrium will always feature
majority acceptance of the next proposal.  Now, however, because of the spillover effect, the third player
may also gain utility from the proposed allocation.  As we will see, this incidental gain will in general not
be sufficient to gain the third player's vote as well.  As in the previous analyses, then, the proposals in a
stationary equilibrium can be calculated by setting each proposal exactly equal to the continuation value of
the targeted player, and then solving for the proposed allocations and for each player's mixed-strategy
probability of offering to each of the other players.
We first solve for the type of equilibrium that corresponds most closely to those derived by Baron and by
Baron and Ferejohn:  a stationary equilibrium in which all players use mixed strategies in a fashion that
respects the symmetries assumed in the payoff functions.  Accordingly, assume that legislator 3, if
recognized, attempts to gain the vote of either legislator 1 or 2 with equal probability, and that in either
case 3 offers the same allocation, w, to the intended coalition partner (and zero to the other player). 
Players 1 and 2, meanwhile, will attempt to attract one another's support with probability p, and with
probability 1-p will attempt to gain the support of player 3.  When player 1 tries to attract player 2's
support, she offers him an allocation of y (and nothing to player 3), and vice versa.  When player 1 or 2
tries to attract the vote of player 3, they offer z to player 3 and nothing to one another.
These assumptions are sufficient to set up equations yielding a particular equilibrium to the game.  First of
all, the players' continuation values are as follows:  for player 1,
V1 = a[pu1(1!y, y, 0) + (1!p)u1(1-z, 0, z)] + a[pu1(y, 1!y, 0) + (1!p)u1(0, 1-z, z)] +
a[½u1(w, 0, 1!w) + ½u1(0, w, 1!w)],
where the three main terms correspond to the possibilities that player 1, 2, or 3, respectively, will be
making the next offer, and the two terms within each set of brackets corresponding to the two different
pure-strategy actions that could be taken by that proposer.  Substituting for u1 in this equation and
simplifying yields
V1 = (1!z+pz+w/2) (1+") / 3.
Due to the symmetries in this case, V2 has the same formula.  Using a similar method of calculation,
V3 = [2(1!p)z+1!w] / 3.7
Now each offer must yield the intended voting partner his continuation value.  This means that the
following equations must hold:  for player 1's offer to player 2,
u2(1!y, y, 0) = V2 ,
that is,
y + a(1!y) = (1!z+pz+w/2) (1+") / 3.(1)
The same constraint applies to 2's offer to 1.  For 1's or 2's offer to 3,
u3(1!z, 0, z) = V3 , i.e.,
z = [2(1!p)z+1!w] / 3.(2)
Finally, 3's offer to 2 or 1 must satisfy
u1(w, 0, 1-w) = V1 , i.e.,
w = (1!z+pz+w/2) (1+") / 3.(3)
Furthermore, the use of mixed strategies implies that each player must be precisely indifferent between
offering to either of the other two.  This yields the following constraints:  for player 1, and equivalently for
player 2,
u1(1!y, y, 0) = u1(1!z, 0, z), that is,
1!z = 1!y+"y, or,
z = (1!")y.(4)
For player 3, the mixed-strategy constraint is always satisfied given our assumption that 3 offers the same
allocation to 1 or 2 and that the two have the same spillover effect on 3 (namely, none).
Equation (4) immediately gives a solution for z in terms of y.  Since (1) and (3) have the same right-hand
side, we can set their left-hand sides equal to get w = y+"(1!y) = "+(1!")y.  Substituting for w and z in
terms of y in (2) and (3) and solving simultaneously for y and p, then, gives the following values of the





Figure 1.  Probability that (1, 2} is the winning
coalition as a function of ".
and of course V1=V2=w and V3=z .  Notice that the value of being the proposer is 1-w for player 3 and is 1-
z for players 1 and 2.  A little calculation (using the assumption "0[0,1]) shows that for each player the
payoff from being the proposer is strictly greater than the continuation value, so, as initially assumed, each
player will prefer to make these successful offers when recognized rather than take the chance of passing
along the proposal-making opportunity to another player.  Since this condition is indeed satisfied, the
solution is an equilibrium when combined with the voting strategy, "vote for any proposal that yields at
least the continuation value."
The outstanding feature of this solution is that, when the value of " is reasonably large, legislators 1 and 2
will usually propose allocations that favor each other, so the apparent winning coalition will usually consist
of those two.  Consider some numerical examples:
First, "=0 is the baseline case equivalent to the Baron-Ferejohn model.  In that case, p=1/2, and
w=y=z=1/3:  the proposer chooses each of the other players with equal probability as a coalition partner,
and offers that player 1/3 of the "pie," keeping 2/3 for herself.  (See Baron and Ferejohn 1989, 1191-92). 
In this case, each of the three possible two-player coalitions forms the majority for passage with probability
1/3.
If we introduce a modest amount of spillover between legislators 1 and 2, those two players begin to favor
one another in their proposing behavior.  Suppose "=1/4.  Then the computed solution gives p=5/8,
w=25/52, y=4/13, and z=3/13.  Legislators 1 and 2 offer to form the voting coalition with one another
slightly more often than with legislator 3; they offer each other slightly more than they offer legislator 3,
and, when legislator 3 is recognized to propose the allocation, she has to offer even more in order to attract
the vote of 1 or 2.  In this case, {1, 2} provides the majority for passage with probability 5/12, and {1, 3}
and {2, 3} form the majority with probability 7/24 each.
A higher level of congruence between the preferences of players 1 and 2 makes them truly predominate as
the winning coalition.  Suppose "=1/2.  Then with probability p=3/4, legislator 1, when recognized,
proposes to allocate 2/7 to legislator 2 and keep the rest for herself, and legislator 2 does the same.  The
proposer receives a payoff of 5/7 + (1/2)(2/7) or 6/7 from this arrangement, and the coalition partner
receives 9/14.  Overall, {1, 2} form the majority for passage with probability 1/2.  With probability 1/4,
legislator 1 or 2 will make the offer to legislator 3 instead, offering only 1/7 to get 3's vote, and realizing a
payoff of 6/7 while 3 gets 1/7 (the left-out legislator, 2 or 1 respectively, realizes a payoff of 3/7 -- less
than his continuation value, but, if we allow an interpersonal comparison of utility, more than 3 gets!).
As " increases toward 1, the probability that {1,2} is
the winning coalition increases toward 2/3.  However,
in the extreme, if the payoffs of players 1 and 2 are
equal ("=1), then they always propose to one another,
and when legislator 3 is recognized, she can gain the
vote of 1 or 2 only by offering one of them the whole
pie--in which case both of them vote in favor of the
proposal.  This resembles the behavior of the
"majority party" in Baron (1989), in that members of
the {1,2} coalition propose exclusively to one
another, but here their behavior involves no kind of
commitment, enforced or otherwise, to propose only
to party colleagues or to vote only for party
proposals.  The party-like behavior is due simply to
individual rational behavior in the presence of strong
similarities of interest.  Figure 1 graphs the probability of {1, 2} being the winning coalition (simply 2p/3
or (1+")/3) against the value of ".9
The General Three-Legislator Model
Now consider the general three-legislator case with equal probabilities of recognition and symmetric
spillovers.  That is, L={1, 2, 3}, pi=1/3, a12=a21=", a23=a32=$, and a13=a31=(.  To identify the set of
stationary, fully mixed-strategy equilibria we can use essentially the same method as in the special case
above, and as used by Baron and Ferejohn and by Baron.  Let p be legislator 1's probability of offering to
player 2, let q be player 2's probability of offering to player 1, and let r be player 3's probability of offering
to player 1.  Finally, let xij be the share that player i proposes to allocate to player j.  The continuation
values can be expressed as follows:
3V1 = p[1!(1!")x12] + (1!p)[1!(1!()x13] + q["+(1!")x21] + 
(1!q)["+((!")x23] + r[(+(1!()x31] + (1!r)[(+("!()x32]
3V2 = p["+(1!")x12] + (1!p)["+($!")x13] + q[1!(1!")x21] + 
(1!q)[1!(1!$)x23] + r[$+("!$)x31] + (1!r)[$+(1!$)x32]
3V3 = p[(+($!()x12] + (1!p)[(+(1!()x13] + q[$+((!$)x21] + 
(1!q)[$+(1!$)x23] + r[1!(1!()x31] + (1!r)[1!(1!$)x32] .
The requirement that an offer intended to solicit a player's vote yield that player his continuation value











Using MAPLE, a computer program for symbolic manipulation of equations, we obtained the following








[("&1) r % ( & $)]
x12 ’ (1&$) ("&$%(&1)2
("&1) D
x13 ’ (1&$) ("&$%(&1)2
((&1) D
x21 ’ (1&() (&"&$%(%1)2
("&1) D
x23 ’ (1&() (&"&$%(%1)2
($&1) D
x31 ’ (1&") (&"%$%(&1)2
((&1) D
x32 ’ (1&") (&"%$%(&1)2
($&1) D
where
D ’ "2 % $2 % (2 & 2"$ & 2"( & 2$( % 2" % 2$ % 2( & 3
’ (&"%$%(&1)2 & 4(1&$)(1&().
Notice that this equilibrium has one free parameter among the probability variables; here, it is taken to be
the probability r.  As is always the case for equilibria in the Baron-Ferejohn model, in this model particular
values of ", $, and ( often yield a whole family of fully mixed equilibria (parameterized here by r), whose
members differ in the probabilities with which each member makes an offer designed to attract the vote of
each other member.  Across the equilibria in this family, the offer values xij and the continuation payoffs Vi
are unchanging.  Changing one of the mixed-strategy probabilities while keeping the Vi constant
necessitates offsetting changes in the other mixed-strategy probabilities.
This effect is most easily illustrated using the equilibrium in the case of $=(=0 computed above; there we
assumed in effect that r=.5, but different values of r would also have generated equilibria, albeit with
different values for the other mixed-strategy probabilities (which would no longer be equal).  In particular,
letting r take on different values gives the following generalized formulas for p and q:  p = ("+1)r and q =
("+1)(1!r).  Thus a higher probability of 3 offering to 1 is offset by a higher probability of 1 offering to 2
and a lower probability of 2 offering to 1.  Note that, unlike what happens in the Baron-Ferejohn model,
there are limits to how far we can vary r:  if r lies outside the interval [1/("+1) , "/("+1)] then either p or q
will no longer be a valid probability.  Similar limits apply to our general fully mixed equilibrium.
Existence of Fully Mixed Equilibria11
5  An example of the latter phenomenon occurs when "=.1, $=.5, (=.9, where the computed value
for q is negative for all values of r in [0,1].
6  Numerical analysis indicates that the limiting factor is the generation of p- and q-values between
0 and 1; in all the examples we have constructed with "￿$￿(, whenever p and q are valid probabilities, the
values of the all the xij are also valid.  We have been unable to prove this as a general fact, however, and it
seems likely that in extreme cases one or more of the offer values could be independently constraining.
7  For smaller values of r, the range of ( generating valid strategies is more restricted and often
more complicated.  For r-values of .5 or less, valid strategies result from sufficiently small or sufficiently
Contrary to what happened in either the Baron-Ferejohn model or in the equilibrium we computed for the
special case of $=(=0, fully-mixed equilibria in our general game may fail to exist for all values of r; and
for certain values of ", $, and (, there may be no fully mixed equilibrium at all.
5  This happens when the
offer values or mixed-strategy probabilities given by the formulas above are outside the admissible range
[0,1].  To get an idea of the combination of parameter values for which fully mixed equilibrium exists,
consider what happens when "=$.  Inspection of the formula for p above reveals that when "=$, p is a
decreasing linear function of (, equal to one when (=(1!")r+2"!1 and equal to zero when (=(1!")r+". 
Thus ( must lie between these two values in order to yield a valid p for the mixed strategy.  When "=$, q is
a slightly more complicated function of (, having a singularity at (=2"!1.  Below that value, however, q is
always greater than 1, so we can focus on (-values above the singularity point.  In that region, q is
increasing; it reaches the value 0 at (=(1!")r+2"!1 and asymptotes to 1 (unless "=$=1, in which case q=1
identically).  Thus we get a valid probability q in all cases in which p is valid.
We can do similar calculations for the values of the offers made by the players, which also must lie
between 0 and 1, inclusive.  When "=$, x12 and x32, which are identical, lie in [0,1] for all values of ( that
yield valid q-values.  The values of x13 and x31, which are identical, are positive only when ( is above the
singularity point of 4"!3; there, the offer values are monotonically declining in (, reaching 1 when (=3"!2,
and asymptoting to 0.  Thus any ( above  3"!2 generates valid offer values.  Finally, x21 and x23 are
identical and equal to a rather complicated fraction of polynomials even when "=$.  However, it is still easy
to calculate that these two offers are valid exactly when ( meets two conditions:  first, ($4"!3 (which is
less than the lower bound for x13 and x31); and second, (
2+(3"+1)(+3"!2#0.  The latter condition, required
for the offer values to be no greater than 1, is satisfied when " and ( are not too large; for example, if (=1
then " must be zero, and vice-versa; and if ", $, and ( are all equal, then their value must be no greater than
, or  0.37. 3&1
2
The upshot of all this is that, when "=$#1/3, fully mixed equilibria exist only when ( is not too large; and if
"=$>1/3, ( must be neither too large nor too small.  The more general lesson is that if any of the three
parameters is large, that is, if any of the legislators' consumption externalities is great, then all externalities
must be similar in magnitude in order for the fully mixed equilibrium to exist.  The leeway available to
these three parameter values also depends upon the value of the free mixed-strategy probability r that is
used:  higher values of " and $ require lower values of r in order to allow a maximum-sized range for (.
6 
This general behavior can be illustrated through numerical analysis of the formulas for fully mixed
equilibria.  If all three parameters take on moderate or small values, there is more leeway for them to differ. 
For example, if "=.05, $=.25, and we consider equilibria with r=.75 (which is among the most favorable r-
values) then all values of ( from zero up to 0.8 generate valid strategies.
7  If "=.25, $=.5, and r=.5, then (12
large ( values (although always only for (#0.8), but not for values in the middle.  When r=.25, for instance,
valid strategies result from ( of .4 and below, near .8, but not in the neighborhood of .6.  For all r-values,
.8 is the exact upper limit of (-values allowing fully-mixed equilibrium.
8  Here too, for some r the range of allowable ( may be in two pieces.  For r=.1, (-values around
0.67 fail to generate valid strategies, although gamma from zero up to that neighborhood, and also between
that neighborhood and .75, do generate valid strategies.  For all r-values, .75 is the exact upper limit of (-
values allowing fully mixed strategies.
9  For such large values of " and $, only small values of r seem to cause the above-mentioned
bifurcation of the range of on which fully-mixed equilibrium exists.  At r=.1, fully mixed equilibrium exists
for all ( from .53 to .9, except for a tiny interval around (=.85.  For higher r-values, the range of
compatible ( becomes a single interval that shrinks as r increases; for r=.9, fully mixed equilibria exist only
for ( between about .78 and .9.  Whatever the value of r, the exact upper bound on compatible ( is .9.
values from about .1 to .75 generate valid strategies, only a slightly smaller range.
8  If "=.7 and $=.8, valid
strategies result only when ( is between about .58 and .9 even for the most favorable r-values, around .25.
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Other Stationary Equilibria in the General Three-Legislator Game
We have examined the possibility that stationary, partially mixed or pure strategy equilibria might exist in
the general three-legislator model.  No such equilibria exist in the Baron-Ferejohn model except as extreme
members of the family of fully mixed equilibria, that is, equilibria that satisfy all the continuation-value
constraints and mixed-strategy indifference constraints, but that happen to have one or more of the
probabilities equal to 0 or 1 (in the Baron-Ferejohn model, necessarily either all or none of the probabilities
would be strictly between 0 and 1.)  The existence of externalities in our model complicates the matter, and
we have been unable thus far to prove analytically that such additional equilibria do not exist apart from
the fully mixed class, that is, equilibria that are not fully mixed and do not satisfy all the constraints (CV1)-
(CV6) and (MS1)-(MS3).
On the other hand, we have also tried but failed to identify any such partially mixed stationary equilibria. 
Such equilibria would have to obey any relevant constraints from the full set above.  In addition, an
equilibrium pure strategy (i.e. a strategy that specifies making offers exclusively to one of the other
players) for any player would have to satisfy the condition that there is no way for that player to offer to
the other potential partner instead, giving that new partner at least his continuation value and retaining
enough "pie" to be better off than if she had offered to the partner originally specified by the pure strategy. 
Although we can identify many pure and partially-mixed strategies that satisfy the relevant constraints, all
have thus far failed this equilibrium test.
The possibility remains that there may be non-stationary equilibria even for the values of ", $, and (
incompatible with stationary, fully mixed equilibrium.  If the "folk theorem" of Baron and Ferejohn is any
indication, there will in fact be many non-stationary equilibria.13
r p q Pr(1,2) Pr(1,3) Pr(2,3)
0.273 0.375 1.000 0.458 0.299 0.242
0.3 0.413 0.963 0.458 0.296 0.246
0.4 0.550 0.825 0.458 0.283 0.258
0.5 0.688 0.688 0.458 0.271 0.271
0.6 0.825 0.550 0.458 0.258 0.283
0.7 0.963 0.413 0.458 0.246 0.296
0.727 1.000 0.375 0.458 0.242 0.299
Table 3:  Probability of each winning coalition, as a function
of the equilibrium mixed-strategy probabilities, when " "=.5 and
$ $=( (=.2.
"Parties" under Fully Mixed, Stationary Equilibrium
We can now examine the appearance
of consistent proposing and voting
blocs in the general three-legislator
model, generalizing our earlier
description of party-like behavior in
the illustrative case where two of the
externality parameters were set to
zero.  In the family of fully mixed
equilibria for any given ", $, and (,
the continuation payoffs for all three
players are fixed.  However, by and
large a player sharing stronger
externalities with others enjoys a
higher expected payoff.  Moreover, if
one pair of players shares stronger
externalities than the others, that pair
will tend to form the winning coalition
more often than the others.  As a
result, in repeated legislative
interactions, that pair of players may
behave as though they were an imperfect party, even though they have no internal organization beyond their
mutual expectation about stationary equilibrium. behavior.  There is really no effect of party as such;
rather, the predominance of one voting coalition, and their tendency to propose policies they mutually desire
at the expense of the other player, is purely the result of individual myopic, rational action.
To illustrate these effects clearly, we consider a few specific cases in which the externality within two of
the legislator pairs is identical and relatively small, and that in the other pair is relatively large.  First,
suppose that "=.5 while $=(=.2.  These parameter values allow a family of equilibria parameterized by r,
where r ranges from about .273 to .727.  As Table 1 indicates, the probability with which {1,2} forms the
winning coalition is .458 for any value of r, while the other two winning coalitions appear with
probabilities between .242 and .299; larger r are offset by larger p and smaller q.  The situation is really
symmetric from the standpoint of legislator 3--she has the same level of shared interest with each of them. 
If we set r=.5 accordingly, then we see that legislators 1 and 2 make their offers to one another with
probability .688 each.  Once again, this resembles (imperfectly) the behavior of "parties" in Baron (1989),
but involves no kind of commitment to propose to party colleagues or to vote only for party proposals.
Table 2 illustrates how this party-like behavior varies when we vary the strength of the externality between
1 and 2 and the difference between it and the strength of the externality between them and legislator 3. 
Either increasing the externality between 1 and 2 or decreasing the common externality between 1 and 3
and between 2 and 3 increases the expected frequency with which {1,2} appears as the winning coalition. 
When "=.9 while $=(=.1, this probability reaches as high as .63.  For those externality levels, legislators 1
and 2 are offering to each other with probability .944 each; when they do offer to legislator 3, they allocate
him only 0.029, and when 3 proposes, he has to allocate .917 of the "pie" to legislator 1 or 2 in order to
gain their vote.14
" $=( Pr(1,2) Pr(1,3)=Pr(2,3)
0.5 0.2 0.458 0.271
0.6 0.2 0.500 0.250
0.7 0.2 0.542 0.229
0.8 0.2 0.583 0.208
0.8 0.1 0.593 0.204
0.8 0.2 0.583 0.208
0.8 0.3 0.571 0.214
0.8 0.4 0.556 0.222
0.8 0.5 0.533 0.233
0.8 0.6 0.500 0.250
0.8 0.7 0.444 0.278
0.9 0.1 0.630 0.185
Table 4:  Probability of each winning coalition, as a
function of the externality parameters, when $ $=( ( and
r=.5.
Discussion
The above examples indicate that party-like behavior
may in principle be a consequence of nothing more
than preference similarity.  When two players are
more similar in preferences to one another and less
similar to the third, as indicated by the externality
parameters, the similar players propose "bills" that
favor each other disproportionately often, and vote
so as to form the eventual winning coalition with a
higher probability than do other possible coalitions. 
When the relative similarity between the two players
is large, this party-like effect is fairly dramatic.  If
an analyst were to observe roll-call votes from
repetitions of such a legislative situations, and the
two similar players had been previously labeled as a
"party," the frequency with which they vote together
might fool the analyst into thinking that some
significant form of party action underlay their
voting.  If the analyst also had a means of observing
the proposals made and how favorable those
proposals were to the various legislators, he might be
even more inclined to invoke party as an explanation
of legislative outcomes.
Keith Krehbiel would rightly object.  The observed
voting patterns would be completely the result of
legislators having similar preferences about bills. 
And the erstwhile party analyst could not respond
that this is only because parties controlled the proposal process, generating proposals that exploited certain
divisions among legislators while papering over others.  Rather, even the party-favoring proposals in the
modeled world are generated by legislators acting independently, solely in their own interests, without any
organizing, gatekeeping, or sanctioning by a party hierarchy.
We have no intention of arguing, however, that parties are not important, even in the U.S. Congress, even
perhaps at the modern nadir of party voting in the 1970s.  The models we have begun to analyze here serve
to clarify the baseline for attributing of significance to parties, combining the analysis of endogenous
proposals and voting as pioneered by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) with the possibility of varying preference
similarities, which, as Krehbiel (1993) makes clear, are basic to evaluating the independent effect of party. 
It is entirely possible that a version of our with a realistic number of legislators would require much larger
differences between within- and across-group externalities in order to generate high probabilities of the
majority "party" providing the winning coalition; perhaps only extreme preference similarities and
differences would generate the kind of false party effects that Krehbiel discusses, and the appropriate
baseline level of party voting would be much lower.  There is no reason to conclude that preferences alone
will be sufficient to account for legislative outcomes as we observe them in modern American and
American-type legislatures.15
10  Since a selection among multiple equilibria is necessary to reach this state of affairs in our
model, one might be tempted to say that even our stationary equilibrium represents a basic sort of party
institution.  But we would have to maintain the Krehbiel no-real-party line in this case:  as our examples
show, in the ideal case of one large externality and two smaller ones all of the equilibria exhibit the same
degree of party-like behavior; moreover, failure to coordinate on one of these equilibria would present no
real problem, since there is no need to identify and punish deviation from the equilibrium path.  The result,
in observational terms, would simply be added noise in the frequency of the off-"party" coalitions and in the
frequency of intra- and inter-"party" offers made by individual legislators.
The main promise of the model we present, however, lies in clarifying this party baseline in a context in
which real parties themselves can also be modeled in a fully endogenous manner.  Institutions such as
legislative parties can be productively studied through models that portray the institution as a feature of
equilibrium behavior in an appropriately chosen underlying game (Calvert 1995).  This might be
accomplished in the one-bill legislative bargaining game studied here, or even better, in a model of repeated
legislative sessions.  Baron (1989) merely assumes that members of his parties can commit themselves to
proposing only bills that concentrate all benefits on the party.  As we have seen, extreme preference
similarities could lead to behavior substantially like this even in stationary equilibrium.
10  But real parties-
as-equilibrium-institutions would go further than this, employing sanctions across stages of the game
(nonstationary equilibria) to enforce a higher level of party-favoring proposals than could be assured by
preference similarities alone.  In such an equilibrium, a party member who fails to propose as prescribed
could be cut out of the coalition in future iterations and replaced by a party non-member waiting in the
wings, similar to the device used in the Baron-Ferejohn "folk theorem" to enforce an arbitrary pattern of
benefit distribution.
The examination of repeated-game models of real party behavior is a matter for future research.  For now,
based on what we have learned from the present model, we are inclined to elaborate on Krehbiel's (1993,
236) definition of "significant party behavior" in the following terms:  Legislatively significant parties,
theoretically speaking, are nonstationary equilibrium institutions in the legislative game that use retaliation
and coordination mechanisms to make members propose and vote in a manner contrary to what they would
do in a stationary equilibrium.16
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